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Abstract: In this paper I explore the dialectics underlying the choice between a geometrical 
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1. Two Ways of Interpreting General Relativity 
 
It is often said that the general theory of relativity (henceforth GR) posits a 
curved four-dimensional spacetime. According to a widespread interpretation of 
the theory, there is a deep nomological connection between the material contents 
and the geometrical structure of spacetime. The key insight behind GR is that 
the curvature of spacetime both determines the gravitational trajectories of 
material bodies and is partially determined by matter distribution. As Misner, 
Thorne, and Wheeler put it: “Space[time] acts on matter, telling it how to move. 
In turn, matter reacts back on space[time], telling it how to curve” (1973, p. 5). 
Gravity effects do not arise from attraction forces à la Newton. Rather, 
gravitation exists because spacetime interacts with matter in the ways predicted 
by the theory. Einstein’s field equations –the theoretical core of GR– describe 
the influence of matter on spacetime geometry. Is this the picture of physical 
reality that GR conveys? GR’s formalism consists of certain mathematical 
objects defined on a four-dimensional differentiable manifold M –roughly, a set 
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of points endowed with a basic geometrical structure. One of these objects –the 
stress-energy tensor Tab– serves to represent ordinary matter, which exists in the 
form of physical fields. Central among the other objects is the metric tensor gab. 
The metric specifies the distances between manifold points belonging to the 
same tangent space. In doing so, it enriches the geometry of M, turning it into a 
Lorentzian manifold 〈M, gab〉 with a fixed curvature and Minkowski light-cone 
structures assigned to its tangent spaces. If the geometrical machinery employed 
in the formalism of GR is taken at face value, it is natural to view the manifold 
points of M as representing spacetime points, and gab –or perhaps 〈M, gab〉– as 
encoding the geometrical properties of spacetime, while the stress-energy tensor 
Tab represents the distribution of matter across spacetime. The equations of the 
theory can thus be viewed as relating matter distribution to the curvature of 
spacetime. 
But GR has also a field-theoretical dimension. Relying on the field-theoretical 
aspects of GR’s formalism, some theorists have challenged the received reading 
of the theory1
In brief, GR poses an interpretational problem. As our preliminary discussion 
has shown, this problem manifests itself with special clarity when we try to 
assess the role of the metric tensor in describing physical reality. Must gab be 
regarded as representing spacetime? Or, alternatively, must gab be viewed as 
representing a gravitational field? Even though the existence of both alternatives 
has been acknowledged in the philosophical literature, especially in connection 
with issues revolving around the substantivalism/relationism debate, there have 
been virtually no attempts of comparing them in a systematic way. A welcome 
exception is [Lehmkuhl 2008]. Following Lehmkuhl’s excellent discussion, I 
will distinguish between a geometric and a field interpretation of the metric 
. On an alternative interpretation of GR, Einstein’s field equations 
describe the interaction between a fundamental physical field –the so-called 
gravitational field– and the more familiar fields represented by Tab. Such field-
to-field interaction is what explains gravitational phenomena, as well as the 
relativistic behavior of rods and clocks. Thus, the basic ontological picture 
emerging from GR involves a gravitational field coupling with other physical 
fields in conformity with Einstein’s equations. The formal object encoding the 
physically relevant properties of the gravitational field is the metric tensor gab. 
                                                 
1 Prominent examples are Feynman (see Feymman et al. 1995) and Rovelli (1997, pp. 183-
195). See also Earman and Norton 1987, pp. 518-520, and Brown 2005, chapter 9. 
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tensor gab –and of GR2
The question of whether gab represents spacetime or a physical field gained 
prominence during the late eighties and nineties, when philosophers of physics 
turned their attention to Earman and Norton’s reformulation of the hole 
argument. In more recent years, though, a recurrent theme in the literature has 
been that the choice between a geometric and a field interpretation of gab is in 
some way insubstantial. With varying degrees of conviction, philosophers of 
physics have claimed that this theoretical choice –or, more generally, the choice 
between the two associated interpretations of GR– is ultimately “a matter of 
whim” (Rynasiewickz 1996, p. 299), “a matter of taste” (Rovelli 1997, p. 193), 
“irrelevant, and probably a conventional stipulation” (Slowik 2005b, p. 154), or 
a “merely verbal question, with no determinate answer […] and also no 
theoretical importance” (Greaves 2011, p. 197)
. The former conceives of gab as representing spacetime, 
whereas the latter conceives of it as representing a gravitational field. Do we 
have grounds to choose between these two interpretations? What kinds of 
reasons can be offered to adopt one interpretation rather than the other? In this 
paper I will propose an account of the dialectical situation underlying the choice 
between the field interpretation and the geometric interpretation of gab. 
Lehmkuhl analyzes the dialectics of this theoretical choice in terms of the 
explanatory power possessed by the different objects of GR’s formalism. In 
contrast to this approach, I want to suggest that our primary source of evidence 
in deciding between different interpretations of gab is a form of argumentation 
that I will call similarity-based reasoning. 
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2 Lehmkuhl considers a third alternative, which he calls the egalitarian interpretation of GR. 
Only the most radical variant of this view, called strong egalitarianism, is incompatible with 
the geometrical and field interpretations of the theory (see Lehmkuhl 2008, section 5). In 
section 2 of this paper I will present my own taxonomy of the relevant positions.   
. The appearance of 
insubstantiality that motivates these claims, I contend, stems from a basic form 
of underdetermination that affects the concepts of spacetime and physical field 
in the context of GR. The two remaining sections of this paper will be devoted 
characterize and defend such form of underdetermination. In section 2 I will 
explain what is similarity-based reasoning. My primary aim in introducing this 
notion will be to show that the problem of interpreting the metric tensor gab can 
be fruitfully seen as the problem of assessing the similarities between the 
3 See also Dorato 2002, 2008, Slowik 2005a, and Pooley 2012, section 7. Needless to say, the 
quoted authors defend significantly different positions, despite of their agreement regarding 
the non-substantial character of the choice in question. 
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representatum of gab and the posits of some other theoretical framework where 
we have a better understanding of the space(time)/matter dicothomy –such as 
Newtonian mechanics or special relativity, both interpreted under a geometric 
reading. In section 3 I will examine an episode of the philosophical debate that 
arose from the revival of the hole argument in the modern literature on 
spacetime theories. By critically examining the dialectics of this episode I shall 
argue that the choice between a geometric and a field interpretation of gab is 
underdetermined by the relevant similarity facts. In virtue of this form of 
underdetermination, there is more than one reasonable way of understanding the 
ontological import of gab. 
 
2. Similarity-Based Reasoning 
 
Similarity-based reasoning is the process by means of which we infer judgments 
about the correct application of a concept from similarity facts. Let S be a 
familiar situation –or domain– in which a concept C clearly applies to an object 
O. This object has features F1,…, Fn and G1,…, Gn. Consider now a new 
situation S* in which there is an object O* that has F1,…, Fn, lacks G1,…, Gn, 
and possibly has other features H1,…, Hn that O does not possess4
 
. Given these 
stipulations, does O* fall under C? Let us define a similarity-based inference as 
a transition from the judgment that an object O* possesses –or lacks– some 
features to the judgment that O* falls –or does not fall– under a concept C. 
Similarity-based inferences have thus the following structure: 
Positive form 
 
O* has F1,…, Fn 
–––––––––––––– 
O* is a C 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 This abstract characterization is inspired by Recanati’s discussion of Meaning Eliminativism 
in Recanati 2004, chapter 9. Rynasiewickz (1996) also sees the substantivalism/relationism 
debate, in the context of GR, as the problem of projecting certain traditional categories –such 
as the concepts of space and physical object– onto a new theoretical domain. 
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Negative form 
 
O* lacks H1,…, Hn 
–––––––––––––––– 
O* is not a C 
 
The transition from one judgment to the other must not be understood as a 
deductive inference. A similarity-based inference can be more or less 
compelling depending on two factors. First, the number of features shared by O 
and O* is relevant to determine whether O* falls under C. The more features the 
two objects have in common, the more plausible is the claim that O* is a C. The 
less features are shared by the two objects, the more plausible is the claim that 
O* is not a C. Second, similarity-based inferences are also sensitive to the 
weight of the relevant features. Not all features of O are equally relevant in 
judging whether O* falls under C. Some features are more significant than 
others. The presence of shared features with high weight increases the 
acceptability of the claim that O* is a C. Similarly, if some high-weight features 
of O are features that O* lacks, then the acceptability of the claim that O* is not 
a C increases. 
Sometimes, what must be evaluated with respect to a new discursive domain 
is not the application of a single concept C, but the application of a conceptual 
distinction involving two concepts C1 and C2. Consider the following variant of 
our pattern: S is a familiar situation in which two distinct concepts C1 and C2 
respectively apply to two different objects O1 and O2. O1 has features F1,…, Fn 
and G1,…, Gn, while O2 has features H1,…, Hn and I1,…, In. In a source situation 
S*, there is an object O* that is similar to O1 in some respects and similar to O2 
in other respects. Formally, O* has features F1,…, Fn, and H1,…, Hn, lacks 
features G1,…, Gn, and I1,…, In, and possibly has other features J1,…, Jn that O1 
and O2 do not posses. Let us call ‘adjustment’ any particular decision as to how 
to apply C1 and C2 to O*. There are four ways to adjust the C1/C2 conceptual 
distinction to S*: 
 
(I) O* is a C1 (and not a C2) 
 
(II) O* is a C2 (and not a C1) 
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(III) O* is both a C1 and a C2 
 
(IV) O* is neither a C1 nor a C2 
 
We can now return to the metric tensor gab and its two interpretations. Let us call 
‘R(gab)’ the representatum of gab. Whereas gab is a mathematical object of GR’s 
formalism, R(gab) is an inhabitant of the physical world. And let us call ‘R(M)’ 
the representatum of the manifold M. The interpretational problem posed by gab 
can then be rephrased as the question of whether R(gab) is a gravitational field or 
spacetime. Stated in these terms, the problem exemplifies the modified pattern 
described in the last paragraph. The source situation S is some familiar 
theoretical framework where the space(time)/matter distinction can be drawn. C1 
and C2 are the concepts of spacetime and matter. The target situation S* is GR 
and the object O* is R(gab). Advocates of the geometrical interpretation of gab 
endorse (I), while advocates of the field interpretation endorse (II). Adjustments 
(III) and (IV) have also been endorsed in the literature on GR5
In order to evaluate adjustments (I) - (IV), the similarities between O* and 
O1, on the one hand, and the similarities between O* and O2, on the other hand, 
must be assessed. Can similarity-based reasoning guide us in choosing between 
these alternative adjustments? I want to highlight two possible answers to this 
question: 
. 
 
Unilateralism: Given the relevant similarities, there is only one reasonable way 
to adjust C1/C2 to S*. 
 
Pluralism: Given the relevant similarities, there is more than one reasonable 
way to adjust C1/C2 to S*. 
 
In the next section I will argue that pluralism is the right position to adopt with 
respect to the conceptual distinction and the discursive domain that we have 
been considering in the present paper. I will defend this claim by arguing that 
the choice between a geometrical and a field interpretation of gab is 
underdetermined by the similarities that R(gab) bears to prototypical fields and 
                                                 
5 For a defense of adjustment (III), see Dorato 2000, p. 1611, 2008, pp. 27, 32. For a defense 
of adjustment (IV), see Rynasiewickz 1996. Adjustment (III) corresponds to Lehmkuhl’s 
strong egalitarianism (see Lehmkuhl 2008). 
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prototypical spatiotemporal structures. My strategy to show that there is such an 
underdetermination will be to consider the reasons that Maudlin and Hoefer 
provided in favor of the geometric interpretation of gab as a response to Earman 
and Norton’s seminal paper on the hole argument. I will then argue that parallel 
and equally persuasive reasons can be invoked to defend the field interpretation 
of gab. 
 
3. The Dialectics behind the Geometric and Field Interpretations 
 
Lawrence Sklar coined the term ‘substantivalism’ to designate the view that 
space –or spacetime– is a substance that serves as the container of material 
objects and that exists independently of them (see Sklar 1976, pp. 161-167). 
Four our present purposes, substantivalism can be defined as the claim that GR 
is most plausibly interpreted as positing such a substance. Anti-substantivalism 
is the denial of this claim. Relationism, which is the most popular form of anti-
substantivalism, asserts that all we need in order to make sense of GR are the 
physical objects and their spatiotemporal relations. 
Earman and Norton (1987, pp. 518-520) famously argued for a conception of 
substativalism on which the manifold M of a GR-model 〈M, gab, Tab〉 is what 
represents substantival spacetime. The metric tensor gab, they claimed, must be 
conceived of as standing for a physical field. Critical reactions to this proposal 
did not take long to come out. During a symposium exchange devoted to 
Earman and Norton’s renewed version of the hole argument, Maudlin (1988) 
objected that a more credible version of substantivalism conceives of gab as the 
representor of spacetime6. Some years later Hoefer (1996) joined the discussion 
by presenting additional arguments in favor of Maudlin’s counterproposal7
 
. The 
two proposals in question have been respectively labeled manifold 
substantivalism and metric field substantivalism. 
Manifold substantivalism: the manifold M of a GR-model 〈M, gab, Tab〉 is what 
represents spacetime. The tensors gab and Tab stand for the material contents of 
the universe. They represent physical fields existing in spacetime. 
 
                                                 
6 The other contributions to the 1988 symposium were Norton 1988 and Butterfield 1988. 
7 See Maudlin 1988, 1989, and Hoefer 1996. These three papers were reactions to Earman and 
Norton 1987. See also Hoefer 1998, which is a reply to Rynasiewicz 1996. 
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Metric field substantivalism: the metric tensor gab of a GR-model 〈M, gab, Tab〉 
is what represents spacetime. Only Tab represents the material contents of 
spacetime. 
 
Each substantivalist position is associated with one of the two interpretations of 
the metric tensor gab. Endorsing metric field substantivalism amounts to 
adopting the geometric interpretation of gab. Manifold substantivalism leads us 
directly to the field interpretation of gab. But a defender of this interpretation 
does not need to endorse manifold substantivalism. The reason is that manifold 
substantivalism is not simply the thesis that gab represents a physical field. It 
also says that spacetime is represented by M. An advocate of anti-
substantivalism might accept the former thesis and reject the latter. Thus, it is 
worth keeping in mind that, in addition to manifold substantivalism, there is 
another philosophical position that endorses the field interpretation of gab.  
 
Metric field anti-substantivalism: the metric tensor gab represents a physical 
field and there is no substantivalist spacetime in the ontology of GR. 
 
In what follows I shall discuss Maudlin and Hoefer’s main arguments for metric 
field substantivalism. I will classify these arguments into two categories: 
offensive and defensive moves. The former are arguments to the effect that 
R(gab) is the object that exhibits the most significant features intuitively 
associated with the concept of space(time). The latter seek to dispel the worry 
that R(gab) also has some of the features intuitively associated with the concept 
of physical object. 
 
3. 1. Offensive moves 
 
Let us start with the offensive moves. Maudlin (1988, p. 87) criticized manifold 
substantivalism by arguing that [A] the manifold M is too impoverished to 
specify the most paradigmatic spatiotemporal distinctions and relations; and [B] 
matter-free universes are physically possible according to GR, but the theory 
does not speak for the possibility of worlds in which there is ordinary matter but 
R(gab) is absent. Hoefer (1996, pp. 11-13) argued against manifold 
substantivalism along similar lines. He offered some additional reasons to reject 
this view and opt for metric field substantivalism: [C] while GR allows for 
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physically possible worlds endowed only with manifold-plus-metrical structure, 
the physical possibility of worlds endowed only with manifold structure is not 
guaranteed by GR; [D] a basic motivation to endorse substantivalism is the 
desire to account for physical phenomena such as gravitation and rods-and-
clocks behavior, but the formal object of GR that plays a decisive role in 
explaining these phenomena is gab; and [E] if R(gab) was a physical field, as 
manifold substantivalism asserts, we would end up with a position that is 
dangerously close to relationism, since the aforementioned physical phenomena 
would be explained by resort to the relations between the gravitational field and 
other material fields. 
I am inclined to think that Maudlin and Hoefer are right in claiming that, from 
a substantivalist perspective, it is more reasonable to view gab as the representor 
of spacetime. Prima facie, [A] - [E] provide good evidence for this claim. But, 
as we have seen, the field interpretation of gab can survive the rejection of 
manifold substantivalism. Even if M was definitively ruled out as a plausible 
candidate for representing spacetime, the advocate of metric field anti-
substantivalism would insist that neither M nor gab represent such a spacetime, 
on the grounds that gab is better interpreted as describing the properties of a 
gravitational field. The force of points [A] - [E] is reduced, though not 
eliminated, when their target is metric field anti-substantivalism. A direct 
argument for metric field substantivalism must show that gab represents 
spacetime and not a physical field. Only an argument of this kind would allow 
us to discard metric field anti-substantivalism, and with it the field interpretation 
of gab. So, what we need to know at this point is whether such direct argument 
can be extracted from [A] - [E]. In his reply to Rynasiewickz, Hoefer argues 
directly for metric field substantivalism: 
 
Why is it proper to view gab as the representor of substantival spacetime? The metric’s 
role is exactly to give us the details of the structure of 4-D, curved spacetime. It 
determines the spacelike-timelike distinction, determines the affine connection or 
inertial structure of spacetime […] and determines distances between points along all 
paths connecting them. In all these ways, the metric is perfectly analogous to 
Newton’s absolute space and time. 
 
By contrast, to talk of the metric field as though it were a physical field –something of 
a cousin to the electromagnetic field, say– is awkward and unnatural. It is called the 
metric ‘field’ simply because it is represented by a rank-2 symmetric tensor, as is the 
main field (this time genuinely material) in GTR, the stress-energy field Tab. Whereas 
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the classical concept of a field is that of something in space and time, whose properties 
vary with location in a space and time that could just as well exist without the field, 
the metric is not in spacetime, and spacetime cannot be imagined to exist if it were 
‘removed’. 
 
[Hoefer 1998, p. 459] 
 
Here Hoefer is resorting to similarity-based reasoning. He points out that R(gab) 
[1] has a four-dimensional structure rich enough to fix all the fundamental 
spatiotemporal facts of GR; [2] does not vanish in any physical world deemed 
possible by GR, and [3] does not exist in spacetime. In virtue of features [2] and 
[3], R(gab) looks different from any ordinary material field. In virtue of feature 
[1], it looks like a prototypical spacetime structure, such as Minkowski 
spacetime. The claim that R(gab) has feature [1] is a positive version of point [A] 
and it is justified by the central geometrical role that gab plays in GR8
In short, Hoefer’s offensive move consists in attributing features [1] - [3] to 
R(gab) and then infer metric field substantivalism by similarity-based reasoning. 
But similarity-based reasoning is a matter of weighing different features that 
pull in opposite directions. The advocate of the field interpretation can 
counterattack by pointing out other relevant features of R(gab) that speak for her 
own view. This is precisely what Earman and Norton did in their 1987 paper on 
the hole argument. Since then other theorists have echoed Earman and Norton’s 
remarks. 
. The claim 
that R(gab) differs from ordinary fields in that it has [2] is a natural interpretation 
of the basic model-theoretic fact underlying [B] and [C], namely that there are 
models of GR where Tab(p) = 0, for every manifold point p, but there are no GR-
models such that, for every manifold point p, gab(p) = 0. Feature [3] is more 
controversial and I will not discuss it in what follows. 
Rovelli summarizes the essential point in a succinct manner: 
 
In general relativity, the metric/gravitational field has acquired most, if not all, the 
attributes that have characterized matter (as opposed to spacetime) from Descartes to 
                                                 
8 Some aspects of the geometry of the Lorentzian manifold 〈M, gab〉 are characterized by 
specific objects of the formalism, such as the Ricci tensor Rab and the Riemann curvature 
scalar R –both of which appear at the left side of Einstein’s equations Rab − ½gabR = kTab. 
Any such object, though, can be derived from gab. For relevant details, see Wald 1984, 
chapters 2 and 3. 
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Feynman: [4] it satisfies differential equations, [5] it carries energy and momentum, 
and, in Leibnizian terms, [6] it can act and also be acted upon, and so on.  
 
[Rovelli 1997, p. 193. The numbers are my addition] 
 
It is widely acknowledged that R(gab) has features [4] - [6]. As Rovelli stresses, 
these are features prototypically associated with the concept of matter and not 
possessed by paradigmatic spatiotemporal structures like Minkowski spacetime 
or neo-Newtonian spacetime.  
Now, do features [1] - [2] outweigh [4] - [6]? That is, do [1] - [2] tip the 
balance in favor of the geometric interpretation of gab? Not surprisingly, 
Maudlin and Hoefer assert that this is the case9
                                                 
9 See Maudlin 1988, p. 87, and Hoefer 1998, p. 460. 
. However, as we saw in section 
1, the problem of choosing between the geometric and the field interpretation of 
gab has been regarded by many theorists as an insubstantial issue. Certainly, the 
spatiotemporal distinctions, properties, and relations that gab determines are 
deeply tied to our intuitive notion of spacetime. We think of spacetime as a 
structure responsible for fundamental facts such as the very distinction between 
time and space, the past/future distinction, and paradigmatic relations like 
temporal order and spatial distance, to name just a few. Hence, [1] is a high-
weight feature associated with the concept of spacetime. As such, it has an 
important role to play in deciding what counts as spacetime. [2] is not a feature 
associated with the intuitive concept of physical field. Ordinary material fields 
do not exist in every physically possible world. Arguably, [2] has less weight 
than [1]. But it gives additional support to the claim that R(gab) is spacetime. On 
the other hand, [5] and [6] are high-weight features associated with the concept 
of matter. Material fields are the prototypical entities that possess causal powers 
and carry energy and momentum. This means that [5] and [6] must have an 
important role to play in deciding what counts as a physical field. [4] is arguably 
less closely tied to the concept of material object, but it provides an additional 
consideration in favor of the view that R(gab) is a physical field. In the light of 
all these facts, no decision as to how to categorize R(gab) is uncontroversially 
more justified than the other. One can reasonably choose one of the two 
interpretations of gab, but similarity-based reasoning does not guarantee that 
such interpretation is the only reasonable choice. 
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If we do not want to end up with a clash of intuitions between the authors 
who claim –as Maudlin and Hoefer do– that features [1] - [3] outweigh [4] - [6] 
and those who reject this claim –like Rovelli and Rynasiewickz–, we need to 
consider other dialectical strategies. What matters for our current purposes is 
that [4] - [6] are paradigmatic features of material fields and, therefore, the 
advocate of the field interpretation of gab can make an offensive move perfectly 
analogous to the offensive move of its contender. 
 
3. 2. Defensive moves 
 
To summarize, features [4] - [6] pose a challenge for metric field 
substantivalism. If it is the case that R(gab) has all these features, it can be 
objected that gab does not represent spacetime, but a gravitational field. I shall 
distinguish two strategies upon which Maudlin and Hoefer rely in addressing 
this objection. I will call them the bite-the-bullet reaction and the denial 
reaction. 
The bite-the-bullet reaction goes as follows: the metric tensor gab represents a 
substantivalist spacetime, but this spacetime is of a very special kind, since it 
differs from more familiar spatiotemporal containers in that it possesses some 
matter-like features. Far from shedding doubts on metric field substantivalism, 
such features give further support to it. For they make GR’s spacetime even 
more substantial. Both Maudlin and Hoefer take this line with respect to features 
[5] and [6]10
But contrary to what Maudlin and Hoefer suggest, attributing [5] and [6] to 
R(gab) does not enhance the acceptability of substantivalism. Rather, these 
features make metric field substantivalism more controversial, because they 
create dissimilarities between R(gab) and the paradigmatic pre-GR spacetimes. 
The more R(gab) resembles a matter field, the less compelling is the view that gab 
represents spacetime. 
.  
Be this as it may, there is a more fundamental reason why the bite-the-bullet 
reaction is not a helpful dialectical maneuver. Just as Maudlin and Hoefer can 
rely on this maneuver to face the threat posed by features [4] - [6], so too the 
advocate of the field interpretation can respond to Maudlin and Hoefer’s 
offensive move by arguing that R(gab) is a physical field of a special kind. This 
                                                 
10 See Maudlin 1989, pp. 546-548, and Hoefer 1996, p. 13, 1998, p. 460. 
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peculiar field differs from other material fields in that it has features [1] and [2], 
but its classification as a physical field is justified in virtue of features [4] - [6]11
An alternative way to react to the challenge posed by [4] - [6] is to deny that 
R(gab) really has all these features. The denial reaction consists in reinterpreting 
the formalism of GR in such a way that R(gab) does not possess one or more of 
the features [4] - [6]. Hoefer (2000) has defended the denial reaction with 
respect to feature [5]. He argues that R(gab) must not be viewed as carrying 
energy and momentum. What motivates the view that R(gab) has [5], Hoefer 
suggests, is the principle of energy conservation. But there is no good reason to 
think that energy-momentum is conserved in GR. If we abandon this principle, 
he claims, gravity-waves phenomena can be viewed as involving genuine gains 
and losses of energy. 
. 
Since this field has feature [2], its existence is physically necessary –at least 
according to GR. However, if we look at things from the standpoint of the field 
interpretation, the idea of a physical field that exists as a matter of physical 
necessity is no more bizarre than the idea of a spacetime that is causally 
efficacious. By virtue of [1], R(gab) exhibits a rich metrical structure. But, as 
Rovelli (1997, p. 194) points out, classifying R(gab) as a spacetime is not the 
only way to account for the fact that R(gab) possesses [1]. The reason why the 
gravitational field R(gab) is chosen as the primary bearer of metrical structure is 
that it has privileged explanatory role in GR, accounting for both gravitational 
effects and the behavior of rods and clocks. In brief, if biting the bullet is a 
permissible defensive move, advocates of the field intereptation can make use of 
it to hold that R(gab) has features [1] and [2] while still rejecting the conclusion 
that gab represents spacetime. 
The problem with the denial reaction is that it reproduces at a new level the 
kind of interpretational issues that we have considered throughout this paper. 
Hoefer’s worry regarding feature [5] is that the stress-energy allegedly carried 
by R(gab) is described by a pseudo-tensor that is well-defined only in certain 
specific circumstances (see Hoefer 2000, section 3). To avoid this result, he 
denies that R(gab) carries any form of genuine energy. However, the solution 
                                                 
11 This line of reasoning has been pursued in the literature. Brown (2005, p. 159) makes the 
point with respect to [2]. Rovelli (1997, p. 194) explains why the gravitational field can be 
seen as possessing [1] even if we endorse the field interpretation of GR. His account is based 
on a relationist reading of the theory, according to which the Leibnizian intuition that 
dynamical objects move only in relation to one another, without reference to a substantivalist 
space(time), is vindicated by GR (see Rovelli 1997, pp. 185-191). 
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proposed by Hoefer comes at a price, because it forces us to sacrifice energy-
momentum conservation. What we are witnessing here, I contend, is a 
similarity-assessment problem, analogous to the problem posed by R(gab) and its 
features [1] - [6]. Armed with our intuitive concept of energy, we are asked to 
decide between an adjustment of this concept that leads us to the non-
conservation of energy-momentum and an alternative adjustment that leads us to 
posit the existence of non-localizable stress-energy –described by the 
aforementioned pseudo-tensor. Both horns entail some deviation from our pre-
GR understanding of the concept of energy. Different theorists will weigh the 
costs and benefits of each choice in different ways12
 
. Since both horns assign to 
energy strange features not associated with the intuitive concept, similarity-
based reasoning does not decisively favor one of the two adjustments of the 
concept of energy. Consequently, the advocate of the field interpretation of gab 
can legitimately endorse the interpretation of the concept of energy on which 
R(gab) has [5], on the grounds that sacrificing the conservation of energy-
momentum is a price too high to pay. 
4. Conclusion 
 
In the previous section I examined the offensive and defensive arguments that 
Maudlin and Hoefer have offered to vindicate the geometrical interpretation of 
gab. I argued that the defensive moves do not confer a dialectical advantage on 
this interpretation. The field interpretation of gab can be defended by using 
parallel argumentative maneuvers. The offensive moves, on the other hand, 
depend upon how the spacetime-like and field-like features of R(gab) are 
weighed. I argued that these features can be weighed in different ways. 
Similarity-based reasoning does not yield a unique correct answer in this case. 
My conclusion is that the choice between the two interpretations in question is 
undetermined by similarity facts. Assessments of similarities belong to the space 
of reasons. For similarity-based reasoning can reveal that some adjustments are 
more compelling than others. But there are limits on what similarity-based 
inferences can do. Pluralism is the right position to adopt with respect to the 
present debate. 
 
                                                 
12 Cf. Baker 2005, pp. 1305-1306, and Slowik 2005a, pp. 1320. 
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